FORWARD SUSTAINMENT BASES(FSBs): AN INESCAPABLE NECESSITY

Shekatkar Committee was constituted way back in 2015 for the purpose of enhancing combat capability and re-balancing  defence expenditure. The committee had representation from important stakeholders. After comprehensive deliberations, the report was submitted by the end of 2016 having close to 100 recommendations. Being a recommending agency,the execution fell in the domain of the Government. […]

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Shekatkar Committee was constituted way back in 2015 for the purpose of enhancing combat capability and re-balancing  defence expenditure. The committee had representation from important stakeholders. After comprehensive deliberations, the report was submitted by the end of 2016 having close to 100 recommendations. Being a recommending agency,the execution fell in the domain of the Government. Though the Committee was formed by then Hon’ble RM  Manohar Parrikar but the ministry had changed hands when it came to its approval. Close to  65 recommendations were approved by then Hon’ble RM  Shri Arun Jaitley  in Aug 2017 which were also covered in a press release highlighting the salient aspects in Mar 2018.

Amongst these recommendations was the review of repair and maintenance echelons, an activity critically needed for sustenance of mission reliable equipment. When the recommendations for various repair echelons were made, the geo-political changes as existing today could not have been foreseen. The current eco-system prevalent needs a review of at least those recommendations which may affect the equipment adversely. Some of the important events needing attention are as under:

  • Rising Chinese Expansionist Agenda.  China has been pursuing its expansionist agenda since it came to power on 01 Oct 1949. Amongst large areas it usurped, Tibet was also captured forcefully in 1951. Since then,  China has attempted to move against the interests of India despite unprecedented support of India to China for recognising the latter , Panchsheel agreement of 1954 and Hindi – Chini Bhai Bhai vibrance. All this   shattered thereafter and led to the 1962 war. Even after the war, China continues to work against India which has resulted in Chinese soldiers transgressing at multiple points across LAC in Eastern Ladakh since Apr-May 2020 nearing three years now. The Galwan clash is a testimony of  its backstabbing and  non-adherence of all bilateral agreements as it neither respects the bilateral agreements nor the international norms when it comes to it’s expansionist agenda. Its renaming of 11 places being the third one in the sequence since 2017 is also a clear indicator of the Chinese intent  in the Indian context. Ensuring mission reliable equipment in such a scenario is an inescapable requirement which will need at least one ‘forward sustainment  base (FSB)’ in the Northern and two FSB’s in Eastern Command due to its wider spread. Such a resource capable of handling all kind of equipments at command level must be created even if it is contrary to Shekatkar committee recommendations and irrespective of  the stage of implementation.
  • Equipment Emerging as the Battle Winning Factor. The Russia-Ukraine war, now continuing since more than one  year has brought out one most important lesson and that  is the  ‘availability of mission reliable equipment’ as the sole battle winning factor. No strategic, operational and tactical strategies have been observed in this ongoing war. The only thing observed is the huge loss of equipment and nonavailability of dedicated repair support to these equipments in the battle field conditions. Majority of our conflict  areas are in mountainous and semi- mountainous terrain and therefore conventional conflicts are likely to be long slogging matches more so when all the three countries; India, China and Pakistan are nuclear armed. The conflict is more likely to continue in the domain below the nuclear threshold. The side having larger equipment fleet with dedicated capability to maintain them under  the battlefield conditions is likely to be the winner.
  • Russia-China Axis. Since the Beijing Olympics of Feb 2020, Russia and China have articulated ‘no limits’ friendship which is growing with every passing day. Despite some pending conflict related to old  border issue as per Chinese perspective , China is strongly building this relationship to counter US influence.  Renewed interest of USA in India-Pacific  goes against the  Chinese priority one ambition of unifying Taiwan. India has also been standing by  Russia in their  current difficult days due  to its long-standing Friendship as well as being the national interest.  In Russia-China-India conundrum, Russia may prefer China over India as in Russia-India relationship, Russia is a smaller beneficiary as against India while in case of Russia-China, Russia also gains substantially. The potential conflict between India and China  therefore is less likely to be subdued due to Russian influence. India, therefore, has to keep itself prepared on its own and it will require minimum three FSBs  for the Chinese border alone which must be operationalized at the earliest to ensure adequate availability of the ‘mission reliable equipment’. Creation of FSBs under concerned Command Hqs is a must.
  • Equipment Profile. Our land forces have their equipment predominantly ex import. Government has initiated multiple measures for the indigenisation but the same will take considerable time to fructify. We cannot create a fully indigenous profile in less than two decades that too if we work in the ‘mission mode’ and give priority to ‘product’ over the ‘process’. Russia, our main equipment supplier is unable to meet its own requirement due to ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Its obvious that its support to all the countries in the world, whom it has exported equipment, has dwindled including India. Creation and suitable equipping of FSBs is the only way forward to ensure our  equipment inventory fully operational.
  • Inadequacy of Alternates Adopted. No of alternatives were proposed and certain of them are being implemented in terms of long term sustenance of equipment by the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) but these will not address the shortfall existing due to non existence of FSBs at least along the Chinese Border given the state of deployment in Eastern ladakh and enhanced activities at different levels for Arunachal Pradesh. Yangtse like events, renaming of places in Arunachal Pradesh, development of model villages close to LAC and operationalisation of Chinese Land Border Law, all are testimony that the Chinese threat cannot be ignored any longer. Alternative means will have their own contribution but dedicated FSBs on the Chinese border are an inescapable necessity.
  • China – Bhutan Convergence.  India and Bhutan have very good and friendly relations but no friends/ adversaries are permanent in international relations. China has been making multiple overtures towards Bhutan for establishing diplomatic relations as well as resolution of border disputes. China is even offering larger concessions in the Northern areas of Bhutan in exchange of areas in the Chumbi valley but such a proposal is detrimental to Indian interest as it threatens the Siliguri corridor. To cater for any further positive  development between China and Bhutan, India may be affected adversely and to preserve it’s  national interest, Doklam like standoff cannot be ruled out. Such and many more similar situations will need mission reliable equipment for which FSBs are critically needed.

The above are not the only reasons for creating FSBs for the Chinese border but there are many more. There is no doubt that Chinese conflict escalation management is a complex issue as our national capacity surge has to take place in multiple domains including economic surge, creation of supply chain, indigenisation & border infrastructure development being some of them.

Majority of analysts have positively commented on border infrastructure development as it is not only part of the sovereignty marker but facilitates employment of forces and resources more optimally. Tunnelling will provide all weather capabilities and make the forces better sustainable even if surge is needed in a particular sector. Absence of focus on border infrastructure previously has put us in an adversarial situation which we are now trying to make up but development of adequate axials and laterals will take time. Similar will be our thought in future for FSBs as well  in case we don’t take this important decision to create them right now. Prior to Apr 2020, no one had visualised about present day stance / transgression by  China. China is our real adversary and irrespective of  status of our relationship, capacity creation should never be downplayed and it is towards this that the Shekatkar committee recommendations for repair and maintenance support to the defence forces needs to be re-appraised and FSBs in adequate Nos must be created under concerned Command HQs at the earliest. Exact configuration can be worked out based on the equipment population and other related factors .

This article by the author has already been published in Financial Express.

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