LIGHT MOUNTAIN  TANK ZORAWAR: BUILDING SYSTEM MATURITY

Lt Gen N B Singh’s article analyzes the development of the Indian Mountain Tank (IMT) “Zorawar,” emphasizing the need for a reliable, agile tank for high-altitude operations. He advocates for indigenous development to avoid issues seen in previous projects like the Arjun tank. The article highlights the challenges of designing a light tank for varied terrains and argues for a slightly heavier model for better survivability, comparing it to the Chinese Type 15 tank. Singh calls for a collaborative approach, similar to ISRO’s, to ensure Zorawar is a superior, locally developed platform supported by a strong defense industrial ecosystem.

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Lt Gen N B Singh, Veteran

A repeat of the  famously tortured development of Arjun  has to be stymied to avoid running aground

Background

          The light tank project has  been  being undertaken by the Indian Army to improve its mobility and reach in the higher reaches of the Ladakh sector to effectively counter the Chinese deployment of its light tank Type 15 that has been specifically built to operate in highlands, plateau, forested regions and shallow inundated areas. The Army had projected a requirement of 354 light tanks . 59 of these are being   developed by DRDO in collaboration with an industrial partner  Larsen & Toubro. For the remaining,  the  Army is expected to adopt  a different programme, for which six to seven firms are in contention, most likely offering obsolescent foreign platforms that have been developed decades ago and looking for markets abroad.  DRDO has been  working with L&T on the project to build the 25-tonne Indian  light tank (ILT), with required agility and ability for quick deployment  in high altitudes and  mountainous terrain. It is to include Artificial Intelligence driven functionality, all-terrain deployability , multi-layered protection, lethal firepower and real-time situational awareness—  all attributes of high-tech mechanistic warfare, loaded with electronic  systems and chips. The brief of the project states:-

“The ILT is envisaged to be as lethal and survivable as the current tanks and will have major mobility advantage to be employed majorly in High Altitude Areas and Marginal Terrain. “

       It is important that the evolution and development  of light tank is taken up with a differentiation instead of treading the beaten path, since the surrounding environment is menacing and threatening. Designing a single platform to operate in all types of terrain creates challenges. What may work in plains may demonstrate chronic capability deficit  in mountains ; take the case of Kornet E missile and Krasnapol ammunition, which had serious operability issues in mountains.  The decision to  take up development of  a regiment worth of tanks using the R&D capabilities  of DRDO  and keeping  296 for the industry may end up as  an activity with diminishing returns or a  repeat of the Arjun experience . Arjun`s system readiness  is partial, simply due to the low numbers manufactured using foreign supplied sub systems. As on date DRDO happens to be the only agency with the knowledge cache to design land systems ground up; having delivered many complex systems like  Arjun,  Akash, , Pinaka , Sarvatra,  etc. No other entity in the country public or private  has this competence and hence DRDO`s effort needs to be fully backed.

    It is reported that the first prototype has been developed and  undergone initial trials of a few hundred  kms at an  industrial facility. It was  expected to be handed over for field trials to the Army by April 2024; something that appeared very optimistic when reported.  If delivered even by year end ,  it will be one of the fastest design and development project  undertaken  in recent years. Stryker design and development was possibly one such project.  This effort of DRDO needs to be supported whole heartedly by designating Zorawar as the Indian mountain tank (IMT) since it is to be majorly employed in mountains.

                 Govt approval for the project to be undertaken by DRDO was given in Sep 2022 and as per media reports it was expected that the prototype will be handed over for evaluation by 2023, a very ambitious deadline by any standards . Even the April time frame  appears to be tight since designing complex platforms like a tank  takes years to come to fruition. As per reports the initial plan to use a MTU power pack was jettisoned and a Cummins  engine selected. The turret and main armament,  a 105 mm main gun  has been procured from Belgian firm, John Cockerill, that  specialises in gun systems ranging from 20 to 105 mm calibre. One hopes, that this assemblage of imported systems finally transforms into  a formidable IMT urgently needed at the LAC.  

Technology Tree

        A look at the technology tree of a  light  tank  at Fig 1 gives an account of the humongous work involved . Around  40 plus subsystems covering several disciplines of technology are to be integrated to operate as a seamless whole, performing  in very trying conditions of terrain and weather and delivering  a desired mission capability . To achieve system maturity (SM), the platform has to undergo several thousand kilometres of tank runs,  several hours of operation of  critical sub systems and firing several rounds of ammunition. It is learnt that DRDO has attempted to mate the Cockerill turret , Cummins powerpack with a local drive line with hydro pneumatic suspension and rubberised tracks.  It may be  extremely difficult to remain within the weight budget of 25 tonnes. This is  because of the stipulation that frontal arc protection has to be equivalent to 600 mm of RHA and all round protection of STANAG  3 i.e. 155 mm splinters and 7.62 mm AP at 30 metres. In addition , explosive reactive armour is  to be integrated.

        One can only hope DRDO`s  re -engineering is  spot on and key  design  and system engineering issues have been resolved.  Design effectiveness and mission effectiveness could  result in a formidable capability being given to the war fighter. Every decision made during the system engineering process must have considered its impact on performance , reliability, maintainability  and cost of ownership; something that was ignored during the famously tortured development of the Arjun and is being realised today when the platform`s mission effectiveness is getting impacted. Similarly, testability which is a link between reliability and maintainability has to be given due consideration so as to achieve a balance between reliability, maintainability, performance & cost.  Failure mode , effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) must remain an area of focus during the entire testing and trial  process.

Weight Budget

     The  weight stipulation of 25 tonnes in QR  appears to   have been picked up keeping some  foreign platform in mind and needs to be debated , seeing  the survivability requirements that have emerged post the war in Ukraine. While a 25 tonne tank may be necessary  to  meet the doctrinal needs of airland battles, blitzkrieg or  airborne operations , its requirement  in mountains and open terrain at LAC is  questionable. Specially, with the now unfolding threat from  the combined fire power of first person view drones ,  precision artillery and situationally aware small teams with anti tank weapons.  Like the Type 15 , an all up weight up to 30- 35 tonnes appears to be justified from survivability angle. This will provide the tank with the required amount of layered armour protection to take on hits and continue  fighting. In the 25 tonne category an  ICV or wheeled APC  with a 30/40  mm cannon and ATGM is more suited to provide  fire support to infantry in mountains.

Tests and Evaluation 

           System test , evaluation and validation requirements are established during the design and development phase of a new system. Comprehensive tests are needed if the system  design is new ,many unknowns exist and risks are high. All these tests are aimed to bring in SM and stabilize system readiness(SR). Type 1 testing is done in early phases of development when engineering models,  software , service test models are built . These are performed in the Development Agency`s (DA) premises. Type 2 testing usually refers to activity linked to preliminary clearance of the system for operational use and could include a vast array of tests. Testing schedule may include performance tests , environmental & structural testing, reliability trials, maintainability assessment, personnel test and evaluation, software and technical data verification. User and maintenance personnel are  present  as observers or  participate in testing .

         Type 3 testing is accomplished by the user at an operational test site whether on land, in air or at sea. Key  Performance Parameters (KPPs) related to operational and technical support functions are measured and verified for compliance. These tests though not representing the actual operational tempos , are designed to provide a close approximation.  User and Maintainability trials comprise  these. It is important that firing trials are realistic and not conducted as staged fire power demonstrations . Type 4 testing is carried out to get a further insight into some specific areas like change in   the mission profile,  total system effectiveness  or  life cycle costs. Finally, I will recommend another testing, call it Type 5 , which is live firing trials  to be conducted on the prototype so as to evaluate the size of fuel and ammunition presented area and likely casualties in case of an ammo hit . It will also help ascertain the effectiveness of bulk armour, onboard electronics, fire suppression system, effect of over pressure and temperature, penetration and spall, secondary fires and other survivability requirements. No amount of simulation and modelling will provide such results that could  save lives of the crew. If a prototype is blown up so be it, machines are expendable , the gallant Indian soldier is  not.

        It is important that the military takes up the evaluation of the prototype with the ownership that is needed for the Zorawar design to  stabilize and mature. It should not be a repeat of the  Arjun  development which went  on a roller coaster. While there was a segment that supported indigenous  development  and favored its induction in fairly large  numbers  , there were others who stymied this initiative by frequent requirement drifts and pursuit  of  the import option. One major lesson of the war in Ukraine has been that  weapon platforms whether East European  or the more sophisticated ones from the West  have performed sub optimally  in terms of  KPPs claimed . Hence, the relentless pursuit of  foreign platforms needs  to end sometime, before their vulnerabilities get  exposed in our operational environment , adversely impacting  reputation of the  fighting force.   There is an indispensable need to create an IMT that adapts itself to the harsh high altitudes of the Himalayas with the agility, lethality and the mythical aura of Yeti – the abominable snow man. In short , a bespoke , indigenous platform that is reliable, modular, terrain hardened ,  easy to maintain and delivers a mission capability several notches higher than  Type 15. This is can only be achieved through ISRO like core values of local talent, local innovation and local supply chain.

FIG 2 : TYPE 15 TANK

The Adversary`s Weapon Platform

      The Chinese VT5 / ZTQ 15 light tank incorporates a 1000 hp power pack and weighs 33-36   tonnes.  It  is reported to have a rifled gun which uses a new 105mm ammunition. The gun is superior to the one used by the Type 59 &  Type 80s.The tank is equipped  with NBC protection,  air conditioning system, command-&-control system ,  tactical command system &  navigation suite that includes INS & satellite communications. Its main gun can fire APFSDS rounds that can penetrate up to 500mm of armoured steel. Its gun launched ATGM with tandem warhead can defeat the frontal armour of T series platforms. The missile can also engage low flying helicopters. Some other features include bustle mounted auto loader, oxygen production system for crew and a battlefield management system .

   It is a modern tank,  developed to offset the disadvantages of deploying heavier MBTs in mountains and  could feature added  technological surprises  seeing the innovative abilities of  the Chinese defence industrial base(DIB). This could provide it a distinct edge over the heavier MBTs deployed . For India the option is to adopt a capability centric development of  Zorawar and no amount of jockeying for an imported platform should change this pursuit of self reliance. Zorawar needs to be designed with equipment capabilities a few  levels  higher than Type 15 and other platforms it is likely to encounter. This alone  will provide the operational overreach and  assurance to the gallant Indian soldier that his platform too  is home grown and will always be in  full readiness , to give  a militarily effective response to the adversary.

Pursuing ISRO`s Core values

    In order to   achieve this noble goal, team work and collaboration of the kind seen in ISRO`s programmes has to become the key drivers of the project. The most important player of the team , the  Army has to change tack and  whole heartedly lead the team . Like Dr Vikram Sarabhai`s strategic plan for ISRO,  Zorawar project has to be envisioned as an integrated whole, involving not only the creation of an operational capability but also setting up the foundation of an industrial ecosystem to manufacture future tracked platforms. Dr Sarabhai knew several decades ago that strategic autonomy will come if the space programme encompasses design and manufacture of rockets, satellites, launch vehicles and launch facilities.

    Wide ranging programmes for development of rocket fuels, propulsion systems, aeronautics and aerospace materials, telemetry and instruments were taken up. On similar lines, once the Zorawar`s design reaches early stages of SM,  MSMEs need to be invited to take up development of the 40 plus systems shown in the technology tree( Fig 1) . Development of next generation technologies like hybrid electric drives, ceramic armour, soft recoil armament, insensitive munitions and hardened electronics should be taken up to reduce dependency on foreign supplied systems.  This process will consolidate the establishment of a local DIB for  Zorawar, which subsequently will innovate and create futuristic  platforms. A little hand holding and profound knowledge leadership is all what is needed.

   What Dr Sarabhai was pursuing for ISRO in the sixties has been adopted decades later by several nations in their quest for self reliance.  Why this approach could not be adopted for Arjun remains an enigma despite the fact that Dr Abdul Kalam with his ISRO background  had ushered these practices  for  the integrated missile development programme. Take the example of Israeli Defence Force`s (IDF) support of  Merkava tank in all  stages of its development . That  over 40  years and four models later , Merkava has emerged as a battle hardened platform with a unique design of its own is a testimony to IDF`s perseverance  and commitment to self reliance .

      The  Army has to  demonstrate similar passion and commitment for the development of its own IMT. It is  crucial to share with DRDO the experiences of deploying East European platforms in high tempo operations in mountains. Inputs on operational vulnerabilities of T series  designs that have led to massive attrition  of men and steel  in the Ukraine war  need to be made available to designers so that  a robust  design of  Zorawar is evolved over successive iterations.  It is reported that an amount of 200 crores has been sanctioned by the Govt for this project. The endeavor now  should be to complete a full spectrum trial with the aim of achieving SM  of critical  modules  like mobility, armament and  survivability. Battle damage repair requirements and sustainability needs during combat operations  in very harsh terrain need to  be identified.  The effort should be to catalogue all requirements ,operational and technical   so that  corrective actions can be initiated in subsequent prototypes. Fig 3 gives out how sustainability and capability readiness gets impacted through a  reliability and maintainability centric development process. Capability readiness is dependent upon system readiness and system maturity.

Fig 3

The aim plus of the trials  has to be to develop complete clarity on what equipment  capabilities are needed for a tank to survive , move and continue its mission at the LAC. No foreign design house or OEM will provide these , at best they can market  high tech gadgets masquerading as Wunderwaffes .  Most  planners in the military  accept such claims on face value . Many a times import option gets exercised without comprehensive  trials  in order to fill an operational void. A few years after deployment , capability shortfalls get  exposed during exercises and deployments and need  for a new platform surfaces. Time for a strategic shift — like IDF , the Army too  needs to put it full weight behind the evolution of an IMT fueled by Indian innovation , centered around  indigenous specifications framed after a deep understanding of equipment capability requirements in the Himalayas ;   not attributes  cut and pasted from  foreign platforms.

     Conventional threats to the IMT could  include kinetic-energy projectiles, shaped charges,  explosively formed projectiles delivered by drones and precision guided munitions  and need to be the focus of designers. Unconventional threats include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and EMP. The tank could use modular armour to tailor protection to these threats.  In addition, the tank needs to be designed for restorability implying the intrinsic need to design a system that is modular, simple and highly maintainable , so that it can be quickly returned back into action . Restorability ensures that a combination of planned engineering support and industrial surge enables daily losses to be replenished , a critical requirement that has emerged from the war in Ukraine. Survivability and restorability are crucial for resilience of the fighting force and should form the corner stone of IMT`s development. 

Conclusion

       The development of Zorawar in a short span of two to three years is indicative of the versatile industrial capabilities available in the country. In keeping with the reputation of  L&T , one expects that IMT is  offered for user trials after pain staking internal trials and with  unique  equipment  capabilities needed for hi tempo  operations in outer Himalayas. It is important that the  trials are carried out with the aim of ascertaining vital  operational KPPs and vulnerabilities. If even 70-75 % operational requirements are met, the effort needs to be given a thumbs up and taken forward with   fast track indigenization of sub systems and components to ensure  supportability. Capability shortfalls can be built into next set of prototypes , tested and re-tested till  full  system maturity is achieved. For purposeful  localization of supply chain , a bold decision to resort to a production run of near 400 IMTs  needs to be taken  by the Govt . By adopting the idea of a bespoke  IMT for the mountains and putting the entire weight of the Indian industry behind it, scarce monetary resources will be conserved, time lines telescoped  and a versatile , customized tank will reach the hands of the warfighter. What a proud moment it will be for all !. Concomitantly ,   the much needed defence  industrial eco system  will  get established . Like ISRO , one hopes that Zorawar too is able to find  a  knowledge leader , willing to trail blaze a maiden  course , determined not to  repeat mindsets  that have  short changed  the Arjun project.

About the Author

Lt Gen (Dr) N B Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC is a former DGEME, DGIS and Member Armed Forces Tribunal. Views expressed are his own.

(This article was first published in IDR July 2024 issue. Published here with the Author’s permission)