SELF RELIANCE: A PEEK UNDER THE HOOD

By Lt Gen NB Singh

It has been a decade since the Make in India  initiative was launched by the Govt as a pivotal cornerstone of nation building efforts. It is time a review is taken up in the defence self reliance sector  to examine  its internal workings and  the actual progress that has been made in achieving this goal . In short, taking stock of the depth and range of technological and  industrial capability development   in the local defence industrial base (DIB).

      For any nation to achieve self reliance (SR) in defence manufacturing it is essential that certain key  technological and industrial capabilities are available in the county’s DIB:-

• Comprehensive system engineering knowhow to design , develop and sustain complex weapon platforms.
•  Capabilities to innovate ,design and develop next generation technologies and sub systems based on available knowledge cache to upgrade vintage platforms  based on emerging operational requirements.
• A versatile network of system integrators , system houses , sub- system and component manufacturers to turbo charge local manufacturing and provide strategic assurance.

Industrial capability

             A capability  gap analysis of the  local DIB  will indicate that not much has happened in this regard. The country’s DIB continues to be DPSU centric and dependent on  largely  build to print capabilities  that were created in the past. The private sector remains  oriented to sell to  military platforms developed abroad either through off the shelf purchases or through technology transfer with limited localisation  . The  supply of  K9 Vajra or UAV Hermes are examples . This approach  may add an operational capability in the initial years but will soon transform into a liability with continued dependence on import of black boxes  for sustaining readiness. . It is therefore important that a revisit of the current approach to self reliance  by specifying  the import content (IC) is carried out . It may be more relevant to look at a technology centric industrial approach to self reliance by focusing on the extent of localization and indigenous development of critical elements of any platform, normally termed as  foundational systems. A whole of nation approach is essential to achieve this goal with all stake holders, more so the military and MOD playing a significant role in strategizing the overall plan.

      The acquisition branch has to ensure that every acquisition must result in creating a novel technological and industrial capability in the local DIB. It should not end up a repeat of a previous acquisition with similar capability gaps. There is something lamentable and retrograde about our past approach to acquisitions.  To quote an example , we are  the only country in the world to have  taken technology transfer  for manufacture of three engines from the same stable… a 780 hp (T72), a 920 hp (T90) and now a 1000 hp tank engine. Any other nation would have engineered its own family of 1000 hp and above engines using the extant knowledge base and a string of world class IITs and NITs. This has happened primarily because of  absence of a pragmatic Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) that  provides  a systems view to this business of acquisitions. It is time DIS is   rolled out by the MOD as Volume II of the Defence Acquisition Procedure.

    For the Make in India initiative to  get traction,  MOD/Acquisition Wing have to be more  focused towards achieving genuine SR . It is important  to strategize every acquisition ,  go under  the hood and identify what accretions can be made in terms of capability  to the local DIB, using high value acquisitions as a bargaining chip. DIS could  provide a direction to this effort by specifying technologies and  a suite of industrial capabilities needed to ensure national security, consistent with the imperatives of strategic autonomy   and economic policy. No doubt ,the knowhow and resources provided by external collaborations speed up operational capability development  but it cannot be at the expense of local supply chains in the name of efficiency  and timeliness . By avoiding hard work and  resorting to integration and assembly of systems we have ended up grounding the SMEs . The priority for  DIS should be  in ensuring that industry can meet the requirements of the Armed Forces, both now and in the future. This implies establishing an  ecosystem comprising  industrial capabilities from cradle to grave at least for major platforms  that are essential to maintaining national  security and operational independence. One cannot guarantee overarching national security with foreign platforms and outsourced supply chains  as the war in Ukraine has shown.

ISRO Model

      A lot is written about the approaches adopted by Israel , China and others  to achieve genuine self reliance starting in  the 1970s when these countries like India were hugely import dependent. While we need to aspire to reach the levels of SR achieved by these countries in the past forty years , we certainly do not have to cut paste their practices  as we already have an indigenous best practice that was envisioned by Dr Vikram Sarabhai many years ago. It can be referred to as the Technology Tree approach .

           Like Dr Vikram Sarabhai`s strategic plan for ISRO, any  IDDM project has to be envisioned as an integrated whole, involving  setting up the foundation of an industrial ecosystem to manufacture systems alongside a robust supply chain. Dr Sarabhai knew several decades ago that strategic autonomy will come if the space programme encompassed design and manufacture of rockets, satellites, launch vehicles and launch facilities.  Wide ranging programmes for development of rocket fuels, propulsion systems, aeronautics and aerospace materials, telemetry and instruments were taken up at the Space Science and Technology Centre and Physical Research Laboratory at Ahmedabad. The enormous payoffs of this visionary thinking are there to see as ISRO forges ahead through indigenous innovation.

Technology Tree Land Systems

     Fig 1 gives out a  technology tree for a typical land system say a tank or a self propelled gun . Such complex platforms would need the integration of around 35 to 40 sub systems and thousands of components to build the platform ground up. A daunting painstaking job ! But SR imperatives demand that unremitting  efforts are put in to achieve the same . However , the Indian   DIB seems to have perfected the art of assemblage. In the case of the light tank, as per media  reports, most systems including the crucial mobility and fire power modules have been bought out  from foreign OEMs and integrated. In short, a repeat of the famously tortured development of ARJUN tank. There was just no need to roll out a prototype of the light tank knowing fully well that it will take a decade before actual production could commence given the pitfalls  and time lines of such critical  import dependencies . The delay in  supply of GE F-404 engine or Arjun power pack is a case in point . It would have been more sensible to cover interim operational  risks at the LAC by keeping  fleet readiness of existing platforms high and other means like aerial assets.

      The current approach of DRDO appears to be a “Race to the Swift“  to beat the competition from industry with almost zero industrial capability development. The light tank  loaded with a large chunk of imported sub -systems  is just not suited for operations in super high altitudes where it is to be majorly deployed. It  would need major modifications that could  impact system maturity and reliability. This is because these foundational systems have not been designed to function in our terrain conditions ranging from 15000 ft to 18000 ft.. Besides, due to very high import content the final cost of the platform 7-10 years from now could  become unaffordable. With each power pack reportedly costing 5-6 crores, it could become a repeat of the  Arjun project. A fine example of how hastily conceived  self reliance initiatives  remain an illusion  despite Govt sinking public funds.

Speedy Indigenisation

     If DRDOs effort has to succeed ,  speedy  localization of critical sub systems has to be carried out , by adopting  the  capability centric  approach of Dr Sarabhai. Design and development of 40 odd subsystems of the light tank shown in fig 1 needs to be  taken up soonest  by the industry primes and MSMEs. Funds of IDEX, ADITI and Technology Development Fund have to be  made available for such  industrial capability development and not half baked technology demonstrators and innovations unfit to  make it to the manufacturing pipeline. Certainly an effort should be  made to develop   key  foundational systems like  power pack, main  armament, running gear, APU,  turret electronics, etc. The indigenous 105mm and 120 mm tank guns have potential to be optimized  to meet new  requirements. If required assistance of foreign design houses can  be taken  ; perfectly justified if genuine SR is  the goal. But the military cannot be saddled with another  tank, which like Arjun has chronic import dependencies.

             Simultaneously, development of next generation technologies like hybrid electric drives, ceramic armour, active protection and  anti drone measures against top attack, soft recoil armament, insensitive munitions and hardened electronics should be taken up with Govt support  to reduce dependency on foreign supplied systems. A pragmatic course would be to be to adopt a two pronged approach — one through DRDO/DPSU route and another through the industry to cover risks of failures  and  speed up development of  these technologies.  Such deep thinking alone can  consolidate the establishment of a local DIB that could innovate and  create futuristic  platforms.  The freewheeling of stakeholders being witnessed today is more of form than substance and unlikely to consolidate genuine SR.

What is to be Done

• Strategic Direction. A medium to long term strategic direction to defence    industrial capability building alongside operational capability development  is sine qua non for SR and needs to  be envisioned by the MOD.
• Delineate Core Sectors . There is a need to give out  specific areas where public sector will operate for reasons of strategic assurance , where private sector participation is open.
• Operational Innovation. Enumerate a set of policy actions to raise the intensity , content and efficiency of innovative activities under IDEX , TDF; so that these come to fruition in  quick time frames and do not remain restricted to incubation centres .
• Local Supply chain. Spell out an approach for sub system/ component level manufacturing by  MSMEs, with the aim of ramping up readiness levels and drastically cutting down import of sub systems and components .
• Technology Insertion .Foster  innovative efforts of industry and  public research institutions  for technology insertion programmes in  existing weaponry of the armed forces, alongside   emphasis on development of   futuristic technologies for next generation platforms.
• Support IDDM Programmes. A no of local platforms and technologies like soldier systems, ammunition,  ATAGs, WHAP, APUs, ARVs,  powerpacks, surveillance systems,  meteorological  systems have been locally developed by the DIB. These efforts need to be fully backed through trials and procurement to motivate the indigenous industry to maintain the tempo and forge ahead with increased localisation. Going in for import options will be a retrograde step.

     An area that can become a big enabler for SR, conserve financial resources and scale up combat  capability in  the immediate future is the incremental upgrade of  complex systems instead of de novo development  i.e. supporting
 and upgrading existing platforms, rapidly inserting technology to meet
 emerging threats, filling up operational capability gaps  and   moving on  to design of  next generation systems. Most developed nations have adopted this course for the past four to five decades without going in for major rework on a new design. With involvement in too many acquisitions than can be paid for  ; what is generally called “ overheated procurement programmes“ efforts and finances get dissipated without concrete gains. The US has continues to support  incremental upgrade of  M1 Abrams till  next generation active protection system and  auto loader get developed . We too need to continue with   MBTs/ICV in the fleet instead of commissioning new programmes like the FRCV/FICV till an array of indigenous foundational systems get developed by the local DIB.   To do this ,  a start could be made with technologies available locally as well as  derived from other countries , to upgrade vintage systems.

Stryker Acquistion

   A word about the Stryker acquisition that has been in the news. Surely the apprehensions expressed that this acquisition is likely to kill  local efforts of Tata Motors and Mahindra need to be addressed.  Post  Stryker  acquisition in  large numbers if it comes to fruition,   there may not be a large scale requirement for  wheeled APCs for next 3 to 4 decades. With the recent political developments in US it is likely that this acquisition may get facilitated . In such a contingency, it may be sensible to go in for a complex variant of the Stryker than the basic APC. An operational capability gap analysis at the tactical level will indicate the critical need for modern AD assets to support  combat groups and IBGs against low altitude aerial threats such as rotary wing , fixed wing aircraft, cruise and regional ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial systems. Extant assets being vintage  may not measure up to such  novel aerial threats on account of system latency and ageing  as the Ukraine war has repeatedly demonstrated. Moreover, with the prime adversary also having access to similar systems from Russia , fielding of suitable countermeasures is a certainty.

    It therefore makes sense to utilize the Stryker acquisition to get access to some unique,  game changing  technologies and fill up operational and industrial capability  gaps by acquiring the IM- SHORAD variant . May be a tall order but this is where Diplomacy stated to be a natural partner of Defence has to step in and make it a   reality. The integrated weapon platform turret system,  Hellfire missile with its fire and forget system,  30mm secondary armament incorporating a chain gun,  mission specific  equipment like multi mission radar, IFF, electro optical sighting system and EW package are next generation systems that could  not only scale up  integrated operational readiness and elevate military effectiveness of the forces at LAC/IB but also plug vital capability gaps in the DIB if the acquisition is handled smartly by the MOD and military. Overall cost implications may be similar or even lower  since fewer platforms will be needed , but the strategic  impact of  saving ongoing  indigenous efforts already put  in the  WHAP programme  and concomitantly addressing critical operational and technology security voids could  be immense.  Deeper  access to these technologies can provide the foundation for building next generation systems (software and hardware) for futuristic platforms using the Acquire, Evaluate and Innovate approach.

Conclusion

     The disengagement at LAC provides an opportunity to the military to renew its approach to integrated capability development keeping the future battlefield at the centre stage. Future combat operations could  be high tempo and high attrition  , hence extreme focus on through  life capability readiness employing indigenous industrial and maintenance surges would be  key to overall mission success. The need for a full spectrum industrial capability to manufacture ,upgrade and support weapon systems is essential  for operational readiness. Strategic readiness, military effectiveness and technological advantages have to be meticulously planned and incubated through systems  thinking. It can come in through local DIB ; comprising local talent, local innovation and local supply chain as demonstrated  by ISRO. Import dependencies for foundational systems are  bound to  impact readiness rates and inhibit military effectiveness . MOD needs to carry out a hard nosed analysis of the extent of SR achieved so far by looking under the hood ; taking a full systems view to   reset the course , plan outcomes and  fix responsibilities of all stake holders. The last decade has witnessed increased  activities  without matching outcomes  akin to   the pursuit of the  Perpetual Motion Machine.

About the Author

Lt Gen (Dr) N B Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM is a former DGEME, DGIS and Member Armed Forces Tribunal. He writes on technology related operational subjects, space and green energy initiatives.

[This article was first published in South Asia Defence and Strategic Review..Nov Dec 24. Published here with the author’s permission]

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