Author: Lt Gen NB Singh (Retd)
“The greatest victories that have been won in war do not depend upon a simple superiority of technology, but rather on a meshing of one side’s advantages with the other’s weakness so as to produce the greatest possible gap between the two.”
Martin van Creveld
Technology and War :From 2000 BC To the Present
Background
The ongoing battle in Gaza has exposed once again the importance of Military Effectiveness – a core dimension of Strategic Readiness(SR). SR is a military`s ability to provide adequate forces to meet the demands of a country`s National Military Strategy. It measures readiness parameters and identifies capability gaps and risks, across strategic and operational domains covering key resource areas. It aims to identify readiness deficiencies that can impact a military`s performance abilities i.e. military effectiveness (ME) . After being subjected to a technological surprise by Hamas , a bunch of irregulars ,the IDF has responded with massive fire power which has caused enormous collateral damage. To be able to convincingly defeat the Hamas and Hezbollah , IDF will have to demonstrate enduring SR and ME . It is too early to foresee the full impact of IDF`s planned offensive despite the heavy posturing seen.
For an Army, SR is its ability, through time and space, to provide field commanders with trained and ready tactical units that can meet mission related operational demands. SR is measured by assessing several readiness pillars: manning, training, equipping, engineering sustainment, logistic capacities and industrial capabilities. SR comprises several core dimensions that require continuous development to enable a military to be prepared for various contingencies. These are military effectiveness, operational readiness, structural readiness, mobilisation readiness, sustainment readiness and resilience. ME refers to the competitive advantage that a military possesses over its adversary i.e. the operational and technical overreach, the agility and depth with which a military can paralyse its adversary in all warfighting domains. It entails the performance of similar military activities better than the adversary . A Nation`s resilience, technological superiority, ability to innovate on the fly, new warfighting concepts are key to ME .
Militarily effective forces possess the resilience to overcome new threats posed by a determined enemy. On one hand ,the war in Ukraine has demonstrated how superior technology can be effectively utilised by a military to stymie high tempo offensives . On the other, the Gaza war has shown how vulnerabilities in technology reliant defences can be penetrated by a determined force to launch high impact operational surprises . The answer obviously lies somewhere mid stream — technology driven survivability domes and firewalls have to have human oversight 24×7. Never letting ones guard down and exposing vulnerabilities, as an old idiom conveys.
Readiness is a complex issue and is not permanent. It changes continually due to loss of skills and competencies as personnel undergo rotations/retirements and equipment capability degrades due to usage, age and adverse effects of deployments. This point is frequently misconstrued by commanders when readiness gets assessed based on inspections and garage availabilities. It is critical for commanders to know how far a force can run and how long it can jump. It is not enough to achieve force parity by mirroring deployments or achieving a quantitative advantage in force ratios. At times resource shortages ( trained operators /crew, low equipment readiness rates) can spiral into critical vulnerabilities. Capability matching involving periodic readiness assessments, analysis of adversary`s capabilities and operational innovations to develop suitable countermeasures are indispensable if enduring ME is to be retained.
The recent capability surprise suffered by Israel at the hands of Hamas is an example of how readiness degrades with time . The last time this happened was 50 years ago in 1973 . Since then, Israel has achieved self reliance, transformed into a high tech networked, militarily effective force with numerous sensors and detectors deployed along the 37 mile long border to guarantee early warning . An Iron Dome provided an overarching survivability umbrella and was claimed to be a game changing futuristic system. All this was duly supplemented by resources deployed for INTEL— Humint, Sigint, Mashint, Geoint. Yet it has suffered a massive defence mechanism failure that could adversely impact the aura of invincibility the IDF has built over the years. An enigmatic example of readiness decline. Like the Bar Lev line , the $1 billion iron wall (fence) was supposed to be impenetrable.
Iron Fence
HAMAS Rocket Fire
Operational readiness
Operational readiness is a key component of strategic readiness and defines the status of major constituents of a fighting force and whether these have the resources and training to undertake missions for which they were designed and kitted. It indicates whether an existing unit or formation is at peak capability for carrying out combat operations. Viewing readiness through a ‘fight tonight’ lens and the practice of focussing on tenure related short term issues does not nurture readiness that any military needs to maintain desired levels of combat capability . Ukraine war has demonstrated lessons for world armies to think, train and plan differently — sensor -shooter links, precise fires, battlefield transparency, use of civilian networks, communications , targeting in a contested electro magnetic spectrum, distributed logistics i.e. pushing out ammunition and material to small teams and units that are widely dispersed are some areas that need to be analysed. The scale of attrition- loss of blood and metal has been unprecedented with even the stronger power finding it difficult to replenish daily losses. Repair echelons and depots , if intelligently integrated into SR planning , could have served as firm bases to enable replenishment of daily losses. Forward sustainment bases, pre-positioned stocks, forward repair teams, organic industrial base capacity ; all these enhance tactical and operational readiness to sustain tempo of operations.
Military Effectiveness
ME comprises components like quality of the force, skill levels , integrated readiness, force agility , technological superiority and operational concepts . All of these are required to be assessed in relative terms. It is important that while assessing ME, shortfalls in ground force capabilities like surveillance or fire power are offset by integration of resources from another, say the Air Force/ Navy, to create a capability overmatch and staying power. Many historians have opined that the use of air power in 1962 could have changed the course of the war. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how sustainment readiness is a critical lever that has wide ranging effects on mobilization, operational and structural readiness and hence military effectiveness and resilience. The halting of the Russian offensive was a consequence of high attrition and equipment failures that could not be regenerated in quick time to restore mass and sustain operational tempos. It is reported that north of Kiev, Ukraine was outnumbered 12 :1. How militarily effective IDF has been caught on the backfoot , remains an enigma.
While mobilisation, structural, operational readiness are needed to architect a potential capability , sustainment readiness is essential for turning this potential capability into its actual warfighting capacity. ME and resilience come higher up in the ladder , enabling a force to spring back from initial surprise and losses, creating new opportunities and fighting back to convert defeat into victory. It enables a military to stay in the fight. A nation needs to possess the wherewithal to transform into a war economy to manufacture munitions, spare parts , game changers to generate resilience and prevent the adversary from achieving its strategic aim .Resilience reflects the ability of military forces, military infrastructure and national assets to absorb, withstand, and rapidly recover from the adverse impacts of an enemy attack . For Ukraine , a factor that stands out is the resilience of its people while in case of Israel it has been its mission focus and chutzpah apart from national resilience that has provided it a battle winning edge .
The impressive counter attacks by IDF during the Yom Kippur war are perhaps the finest example of how ME created the competitive advantage for IDF to push back the Egyptians . In Gaza strip , Israel`s initial response has been impactful, but with mounting civilian casualties , IDF may be constrained to proceed in a calibrated manner. In East Europe , Ukraine`s counter offensive is unable to maintain required operational tempos as they can barely manage equipment readiness rates of 50% — finding it difficult to replace daily attrition. How can enduring ME be inbuilt by the military and retained 24×7 is a question that needs to be considered by military strategists and planners, taking into account the qualitative and quantitative strengths of the prime adversary (PLA), that has the largest standing military and is aspiring for technological parity with the world`s lone super power.
The Ukraine war and Gaza conflict have demolished the myth that technology can replace mass. Given below are three issues that could have a lasting impact on military effectiveness . These are soldier or personnel readiness , equipment readiness and technological dominance.
Soldier Readiness
Soldier readiness also referred to as Individual readiness relates to training, equipping, combat skills and competencies of an individual while operating in a team or performing specialists functions . Operator and maintainer skills have played a major role during combat . Weapon handling , gunnery skills, expertise in operating complex sensor shooter links, EW systems and AI driven devices are some present day skills that can raise a unit`s operational effectiveness. Superior technical skills demonstrated by Ukrainians has enabled its forces to digitalise vintage Soviet platforms and network these for todays algorithmic warfare. Using its access to Starlink, a constellation of LEOS ( low earth orbit satellites) it has provided connectivity and intelligence down to small teams and sections . This has allowed it to use data streams in smart ways. Live feed of the frontlines can be seen on a Macbook and COTS drone despatched to precisely locate targets and destroy using precision fires. Data driven combat is being waged at unprecedented speeds and accuracy. All this will be feasible if soldiers are trained for 21st century skill sets , not sluggish battle drills of previous wars. The Agniveer scheme provides an opportunity to usher a transformational change in human resource recruitment and competency development.
Equipment Readiness.
Increased battlefield transparency as has been witnessed in the war in Ukraine could lead to massive attrition in future wars and forces may be out numbered with rapid reduction of combat power. Add to it low equipment readiness rates due to ageing inventory and band aid engineering sustainment measures , there could be a crisis after a few weeks of warfighting. The set back the IDF suffered in Lebanon in 2006 led to significant changes in weapon platform design and development , more so wrt survivability, agility and situational awareness. The lesson learnt from the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict and Russia`s offensive into Ukraine have initiated a host of new developments within PLA. The vulnerabilities of East European platforms against modern day countermeasures should trigger a host of home grown innovation to upgrade and make these future ready. Up -armouring, up- gunning , re-powering and digitalization are prospective areas where newer combat capabilities can be created in legacy platforms . New acquisitions need to focus on increased tactical and operational mobility of platforms in high altitudes, all round survivability , operability, durability , modularity and high maintainability. One significant lesson from the current conflict in Ukraine has been the importance role local supply chains , maintenance / industrial surges and home grown innovations can play towards military effectiveness . The is therefore a need to put the Make in India programme in the overdrive, create a robust defence industrial base that can roll out large number of simple, bespoke, lethal weapon platforms powered by indigenous generic or foundational systems . A study of the future battlefield in the sub continent is essential to identify futuristic operational requirements that could set the stage for future equipment capability development.
Technological Dominance
The war in Ukraine has become a test bed for technology. It has honed the concept of the “kill chain“ that was talked about in Powerpoint presentations since the nineties, animating the seek and destroy principle. Search and destroy has become a reality. Sensors of all kinds ( video, thermal, radar) detect targets , pass target data to the platforms and the best located shooter delivers precision fires to destroy the target. Combat operations will now be under constant observation and contact. Drones have become the heart of this web based operations. It is not only collecting huge amount of imageries but also using elementary ML and AI, identifying if the target is a T72 or T90, concomitantly transmitting coordinates for precision fires. This digitization has made Russian platforms appear helpless, despite their relative sophistication and fire power. It is reported that software based targeting has reduced ammunition expenditure by 15 -30% . Technology helps condition tactics, strategy, organization, logistics, intelligence, command, control, and communication. Technological dominance could thus become a key pathway towards achieving ME. With PLA aspiring to achieve technological parity with US and striving for technological dominance , it can bring in new forms of preemption. It is important that the Indian military recalibrates programmes like IDEX, IDEX Prime, TDF to incubate ME and develop novel capability surprises. Our youth has to be groomed to innovate ahead of rest of the world. Space, cyber, EW, anti drone, high powered microwaves, quantum computing, AI are some areas where sustained efforts are required to achieve technological parity if not dominance over PLA . However, excessive dependance on technology could result in diminishing returns as events in the past and present are revealing.
Tank destroyed by Sensor -Shooter Link
Preventing Preemption
Today the bandwidth to deliver surprise over an expanded battlespace has increased due to globalization, covering cyber, electro magnetic spectrum , space, information, besides conventional domains. It has become increasingly feasible for adversaries to develop counters to known capabilities. Dependence on foreign systems has created vulnerabilities, as specifications get shared if similar systems are acquired by others e.g. Sukhoi, S400, T90/T80 tanks. Counters get developed in quick time . This fast tracked cycle of measure/countermeasure/counter-countermeasure will continue to add surprise to future conflicts. In the new era of aspiring power competition, PLA could employ many layers of stand off in multiple domains to deliver surprise. Non- kinetic effects like disruption of communications, denial of tracking & navigation capabilities, fakes , information overload could precede kinetic operations. The future force may therefore have to equipped with abilities to operate across domains. This calls for employment of the military`s intellectual firepower to think beyond the algorithm and evolve doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, systems, human resource and processes for sustained ME. Exercises and experimentation must follow thereafter, replicating the future battlefield –expansive, lethal and hyperactive with increased strategic ambiguity and entropy. The capability of early warning and launching own surprises across the Himalayas must be silently incubated and honed .
Conclusion
The Battle of Saragarhi: The Last Heroic Stand
The best way for a military to know its strengths is to do vulnerability matching. ME can be incubated by intentionally working on leveraging traditional competencies and balancing vulnerabilities. The Indian soldier has a strong competence in operating from fixed positions in mountains. The battle of Saragarhi and Rezangla are examples of some great last stands in history. The art of guerilla warfare perfected by Shivaji against the Moghuls is worth reinventing in its modern, technology driven avatar to cause catastrophic disruptions. The Himalayas too have since times immemorial provided an impregnable line of defence to the subcontinent. ME against the PLA needs to be woven around the unflinching courage, toughness of the Indian soldier , traditional combat skills and advantages of terrain with innovative employment of technology.
About the Author
Lt Gen (Dr) N B Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC is a former DGEME, DGIS and Member Armed Forces Tribunal. He writes on technology related operational subjects, space and green energy initiatives.
(This article was first published by South Asia Defence and Strategic Review. Published here with the author’s permission)
