YEAR OF REFORMS: MANAGING COMPLEXITIES OF SELF RELIANCE

Time for a Deep Reset

Lt Gen NB Singh (Retd)

On Wednesday (January 1, 2025)  India declared 2025 as the year of defence reforms aiming to bring to fruition the   rolling out of  integrated theatre commands to ramp up  synergy among the three services,  transform the military into a technologically-advanced combat-ready force.  Comprising nine focus areas ,   these initiatives aim to lay the foundation for “unprecedented” advancements in defence preparedness and ensure India’s security and sovereignty amid challenges of the 21st century as stated by Hon`ble  Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. One focus area is to  make the defence acquisition procedure simpler ,  time-sensitive, ensuring  deeper collaboration among  stakeholders, breaking silos, eliminating inefficiencies and optimising resource utilisation. Defence Secretary R K Singh too has acknowledged the need for a complete revamp terming the policy as “broken”.[1]

      It has been a decade since the Make in India initiative was launched by the Govt as  a strategic move to reduce external dependencies in defence. Traditionally, since independence Indian [i]military has been dependent on external sources for a large portion of  its  hardware.

The inventory comprises a unique medley of platforms and equipment sourced from a host of countries like Russia, France, USA, UK and smaller countries like Israel, Sweden, South Korea, etc. According to SIPRI India was the largest importer of military equipment, with 45% of the total imports from Russia during the period  2018-2022 .  Such large dependencies  may add an operational capability to start with but  once acquired, its upkeep often poses readiness challenges  . Hence adequate state capacities have to be  built to deal with the emerging security matrix.

Complexities of Self Reliance (SR)

    SR in combat platforms and strategic military technologies is a complex and multifaceted challenge, influenced by various factors :-

• Technological Complexity: Strategic military technologies are often cutting-edge and complex, requiring significant research and development (R&D) investment, skilled personnel, and advanced infrastructure.
• Economic Constraints: Achieving self-reliance in such technologies can be economically demanding, requiring substantial financial resources for R&D, production, and maintenance.
• Geopolitical Factors: International relations and geopolitical considerations can influence access to critical technologies and components, potentially hindering self-reliance efforts.
• Time Constraints: The rapid pace of technological advancement necessitates continuous innovation and adaptation, making it challenging to maintain self-reliance over time.
• Intellectual Property Rights: Protecting intellectual property rights related to military technologies is crucial for maintaining a competitive edge, but can also pose challenges for international collaboration and technology transfer.
• Human Capital: A skilled workforce with expertise in relevant scientific and engineering fields is essential for successful R&D and production of advanced military technologies.
• Defence Industrial Base (DIB): A robust and diversified industrial base capable of supporting the development and production of complex military systems is critical for achieving self-reliance.
• Bureaucracy and Regulations: Complex bureaucratic procedures and regulations can hinder the efficient development and procurement of military technologies.
• Maintaining Balance: Striking a balance between self-reliance and international cooperation is crucial for avoiding isolation and benefiting from global technological advancements.

      These challenges highlight the need for a strategic approach to  SR in military technologies, encompassing robust R&D investments, fostering a skilled workforce, promoting a competitive industrial base, and navigating the complexities of the global technological landscape. For  acquisition reforms to be of practical consequence, a review of the progress made so far  in building resilience and adequate  capacities in the country`s DIB , becomes indispensable. Reset in the overall approach, with a more meaningful  collaboration between government–industry- military  may be desirable seeing the results  achieved so far.

    The unique nature of  defence requirements in the Indian context  requires a bespoke approach that is focused on innovating customised solutions relevant to our terrain and planned operational tempos. This alone can generate desired military effectiveness besides ensuring that strategic imperatives and operational independence are retained. No amount of wonder weapons from foreign OEMs can meet this requirement. This singular lesson has been driven home in the protracted war in Ukraine where the warring sides can barely maintain around 50% readiness rates. Hence there is no alternative to  nurturing strong capabilities in our   DIB, establishing robust local supply chains and strong relations with trusted nations. It must be understood that when facing multiple and complex threats  we have to derive  strategic advantage through qualitatively superior weapon platforms , unique game changing technologies and  a  resilient DIB that provides required staying power .

     Foreign systems are designed for  different duty cycles compare to what is required in the Himalayas.  The large numbers needed by our  military can   facilitate development of   customised platforms that are affordable and perform in our operational environment. Our military for ever cannot remain a market for Western Military Industrial Complex (MIC).  When facing  a rising  super power  ; such external dependencies are  akin to losing the contest abinitio—what remains  to follow is enormous loss of men and metal.  An approach that builds on   existing industrial strengths,  availability of local talent both academic and technical  , augmented S&T research  and continued cooperation with friendly nations to fill industrial capability gaps is needed.  This reset towards a more tailored approach to  defence self reliance  is a fail safe pathway towards enhanced military effectiveness and operational overreach.

Defence Industrial Base

        India is among the few countries that has produced a fourth-plus generation fighter aircraft, aircraft carrier, conventional and  nuclear submarines, main battle tanks , ballistic missile, artillery guns and rockets , radars and air defence missiles. Such  capabilities are  possible only when a country possesses a versatile , state of the art DIB. Yet , what is noticed is the presence of significant capability gaps in the DIB, be it at the level of design, systems engineering,  foundational systems,  generic cross cutting  technologies, components .  This has happened because most of the afore mentioned platforms have been rolled out  , using foreign propulsion systems, sensors, armaments, weapon equipment packages etc. In short, it is more an assemblage of proven foreign sub systems designed for  other platforms; passed on to us as these became obsolescent in the country of origin. For long we have accepted this as a solution to our own limitations.

     The flop side of this approach  is that delivery schedules can go for a toss if the OEM is unable to honour time lines and readiness rates nose dive if supply chain  goes cold . Recently, the Air Chief has highlighted the issue of delayed deliveries of Tejas  aircraft and observed that technology loses relevance if it is unable to meet timelines . Similarly, the manufacture of Arjun Mk 2 is in suspended animation due to non availability of  imported mobility pack. where price has been hiked manifold . Sadly,  this best practice continues . Zorawar being the latest offering on the block—packed with more and more foreign systems;  Arjun ,at least had a local  ordnance, Kanchan armour, suspension(HSU) to name a few  .

    It is essential to build an elaborate technology & engineering ecosystem to mesh in extant indigenous capabilities  and foreign technology that could come through JVs & technology transfers to craft out  systems most suited for duty cycles in Indian conditions.  DIB  ecosystem  ideally comprises:-

• Prime Contractor or Systems Integrator. An entity with industrial capability to deliver a complex system or product like an AFV, ship or aircraft.  It requires high grade systems engineering skills, processes & tools to integrate a complex system and testing facilities to test & prove system functionalities.
• Partial System Manufacturer. These manufacture independent systems which while possessing independent purpose, are relevant when integrated in to a complex system e.g. air defence missile.
• Sub-System Manufacturer.  They manufacture systems which give a capability to the complex system only when integrated with the platform e.g. a power pack, aero engine .
• Component Manufacturers.  These entities generally MSMEs provide finished assemblies/aggregates/LRUs which form part of sub-systems/systems e.g. engine parts, PCBs, sensors, harnesses.
• Design Houses.  These are knowledge based organisations (Design Authority) with unique systems engineering skills, a suite of modern  modelling & simulation processes & tools  and facilities to test & prove at system/sub-system level.
• Academic Partners. Universities, colleges and research institutes  enable creation of next generation technology through incubators and accelerators. Academic partners could provide finance from research grants, consulting, mentoring and facilitate  technology transfer to move an innovation into the development pipeline. [1]

  Reforms To Boost SR

The Govt has regularly indicated its intention to going  vocal for local by announcing a host of initiatives to give traction to  the “Make in India” campaign that seeks to increase domestic production  and invites foreign direct investment. To foster the nurturing of a mature DIB , the government has established  Defence Industrial Corridors in UP and Tamil Nadu.  These defence corridors aim to create a well-planned and efficient ecosystem leading  to increased defence production in the country.

The Government has created a  Defence Innovation Organization (DIO) under MOD to encourage innovation and development of critical defence technologies . The DIO facilitates  collaboration  between the military, industry,  academia  and design centres and provides funding through the IDEX and ADITI programmes. It  has periodically amended the Defence Acquisition Procedure. However , it can  be made flexible to promote SR if  it is redrafted as Defence Acquisition Guidelines.  It has set in motion some serious reforms in DRDO to ensure accountability , doing more with less, focus on research and innovation  in core  technologies  and allow private sector to design and develop prototypes. The concept of strategic partnership and development cum production partner has also been introduced to boost SR.

    However,  having got used to an “ all is well” attitude for the past 3 to 4 decades, the stake holders slip back to default position  once the optics are over. At grass root level it is business as usual ; operating in silos, over leveraging of options from abroad, buy, assemble and roll out; instead of absorb, innovate and manufacture. We are perhaps the only country in the world to have taken ToT of two tank engines- a 780 hp and a 920 hp   and  gearing up for a third,  1000 hp . With a string of world class institutes and  an absorb and innovate orientation we could  have created an indigenous family of engines to power the FRCV, FICV , WHAP and light tank.

   It is time some specific structural challenges affecting acquisitions and wider industrial competitiveness are addressed . These have arisen due to a lack of constructive dialogue between the  industry,  MOD and military, absence of a defence industrial strategy, understanding the basic approach to indigenisation and redefining the workspace of DRDO.  Without dialogue, it becomes difficult  to make informed  procurement decisions that get   based on  a cockpit view without deeper  knowledge of  capabilities. Also, in pursuit of short term options like emergency procurement, without  an understanding of wider benefits to the country  in terms of prosperity,  strategic assurance and resilience that local systems provide, the  military ends up with  a medley  of inventory that cannot be sustained .

    In the absence of a Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), industry primes  and sub system developers  both public and private  find it extremely difficult  to justify  long term investments in their workforces, production lines or R&D without  certainty  of  the military`s commitment to future programmes. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs)  also found it  difficult to find ways to develop innovative solutions due to procedural complexity , drifting  QRs and absence of repeat orders in the name of vendor base expansion. These are discussed below.

Military- Industry-DRDO Reset

   One area identified for  intervention during 2025 is scaling up collaboration between various stake holders in the defence ecosystem, breaking silos, effective civil military coordination to eliminate inefficiencies and optimise resources. It is important that a whole of nation approach is adopted to bring to fruition India`s aspirations to become a developed economy during the Amrit kaal i.e. next 25 years or so. An integrated  approach is desirable wherein the military, DRDO and industry have to be on the same page. The rigid stance that indigenous platform is not meeting  QRs has to be replaced with a flexible approach of understanding the fact that foreign systems being offered have been optimised over several decades after  prototyping. The local effort needs to be given some time and hand holding  to achieve similar system maturity.

     Take the case of  ATAGs. Having developed a platform that has met most key performance parameters, it is axiomatic that Govt  demonstrates a commitment to hand holding  with EOQ  and repeat orders. Military should leave  no stone unturned in  supporting  the two indigenous 52 calibre ordnances and facilitate its   reaching  system maturity soonest. This will enable  these guns to attain global fame like the famous Soviet 122mm field gun developed in 1938 and whose successor the D-30 of 1960 design is still being used in Ukraine.  Issues like increased weight, range shortfalls  can  be addressed in the stride. Instead one finds a lamentable lack of distant vision  when  search for a new towed system  starts by setting QRs  based on attributes of a foreign  system .

     Similarly , a distinct lack of ownership  has been noticed wrt to the mobility upgrade  of BMP2 without appreciating that the industry has spent crores in evolving a solution to a problem that is peculiar to our terrain. This effort should be allowed to mature because it will be the first of its kind mobility  solution for HAA and help launch a technological surprise on the adversary . Earlier in the eighties when the Army had  whole heartedly supported local innovation , up gunning of tank  T55 was carried out at an army base workshop before the Soviets . That over 1000 tanks were up gunned using an Indian 105mm  ordnance speaks volumes of the creative work accomplished and the huge savings that resulted by stopping import of 100mm tank ammunition.

 

   Gaps in industry–military  dialogue, will more often than not be to  the military`s disadvantage  because foreign platforms mostly end up widening   operational capability gaps, due to  performance shortfalls and  low  readiness rates . This could    impact operational effectiveness. It is one thing to place platforms in difficult terrains like Depsang and Demchok and another to ensure that these deliver the desired operational tempos.

        It is therefore important that both MOD and the military view industry as technology partners and the procurement mindset  gets transformed  to a deeper  understanding of  acquisitions  i.e. acquisition of a sustainable operational capability along side  creation of  local  industrial and technological capability. General stores like socks and shoes are procured whereas complex systems are acquired to deliver a sustainable capability. Close collaboration between government, the military and industry will also lead to successful exports and  delivery of not only   economic benefits but also diplomatic through   strategic affiliation.

Defence Industrial Strategy

     Pursuing long term activities without a strategy is like driving without a destination as stated by the Hon`ble Foreign Minister in his book “Why Bharat Matters”.[1]  It is important  to strategize  ,  go under  the hood and identify what accretions can be made in terms of capability  to the local DIB, using high value acquisitions as a bargaining chip. DIS could  provide a direction to this effort by specifying technologies and  a suite of industrial capabilities needed to ensure national security. The priority for  DIS should be  in ensuring that industry can meet the requirements of the Armed Forces, both now and in the future. This implies establishing an  ecosystem comprising  industrial capabilities from cradle to grave .

Indigenisation

     Indigenisation in India apparently refers to assembly and integration of a product within its  geographical territory . At least that is what is noticeable when  one goes deeper to see as to how various systems,  civil or military are  being manufactured locally. ; assemble and profit using low cost  sub systems and components seems to be the best practice be it air conditioners,  mobiles , drones or combat systems . This has grounded domestic manufacturing. Take the case of the light tank; with the mobility , armament , surveillance and survivability modules all ex import, what is the  local content? Most EVs are being assembled courtesy sub systems sourced from abroad. One can imagine the enormous vulnerability this approach can introduce into national security architecture if not addressed. Self reliance in defence surely cannot be based on efficiencies of foreign supply chains.[2]

New Platforms

      In order to give a boost to SR it may be a good idea to go slow with the RFPs of  new platforms for a period say five years and focus on the country`s skills fit ,  academic readiness , industrial capabilities and capacities in designing and developing foundational and generic systems  for future platforms like FRCV, FICV, tube  artillery, UAVs, aerial and marine systems. Interim risks can be covered through technology insertion in existing platforms where feasible. Future RFPs need to specify the type of sub systems that have to be mandatorily  made in India before prototyping to plug  capability gaps. Imagine  a sixth generation fighter being manufactured  with its propulsion system, landing gear , sensors and main armaments sourced from abroad, integrated into an indigenous  airframe  fabricated using imported   raw material !

DRDO`s Work Space

       Focussing on collaboration across various stake holders and sharing of knowledge between defence sector and civil industry is another area of proposed reforms. I have always maintained that DRDO is the only agency in the country with significant levels of system architecting skills to design platforms ground up. There are certain capability gaps which need to be filled up. It is therefore important that the pursuit of self reliance is  carried out with DRDO being a  partner  and not without it as many misconstrue. Effective mentoring of the industry`s workforce in future combat systems engineering skills, defence innovation and sustainability  by DRDO  will help accelerate the tempo of indigenisation. DRDOs needs to look at initiating projects to develop foundational systems for all major platforms in concert with industry specially MSMEs. Such systems if developed successfully could power not only the military`s future combat systems but also find application in civilian sector. e.g development of electric drives, next generation batteries, unmanned systems, AI enabled surveillance and security technologies could be effectively used in zero emission trucks, airport security, immigration, policing ,etc. One area where DRDO needs to put added efforts is energetics and insensitive munitions as these will greatly enhance  performance and safety of indigenous platforms.

Capability Evaluation Board

     One prominent area of proposed reforms  is developing a shared understanding of operational requirements and joint operational capabilities. Seeing the serious nature of this reform it may be relevant to consider creating a Capability Evaluation Board(CEB) at MOD. The principal responsibility of CEB would be to carry out an integrated review of capability  readiness and  identify  capability gaps. In analysing these they need to be provided resources to independently collect inputs and not rely on information that is pumped up by the system. No platform should be cleared for production unless the CEB certifies that it  meets  stated operational requirements, indigenisation norms  and quality standards that  will shore up integrated readiness and industrial resilience. This is indispensable to regulate the free wheeling of  stake holders that occupies centre stage today.

Conclusion

     A  reset towards a more tailored approach to the defence acquisitions is sine qua non to  creation of a defence industrial ecosystem for the long haul.[3] It is  important that  key stakeholders  acknowledge this need and move forward to implement the same with renewed commitment starting with  the year of reforms. Self-reliance in strategic military technologies is a complex pursuit, requiring a multifaceted and strategic approach. Prioritizing critical technologies, fostering robust R&D  in foundational systems, cross cutting and next generation technologies,  allocating significant resources to government-funded research  in critical military technologies, promoting public-private partnerships, encouraging collaboration are some areas that need refinement.

      It is equally critical to  develop domestic manufacturing capabilities by supporting  the growth of a robust domestic defence industry . Developers of WHAP, Dhanush, ATAGs, met systems, drones need to be supported to the hilt and incentivised  to continue  indigenous innovation. We have to attract and retain top talent by investing  in STEM education and create attractive career paths for scientists and engineers. We have to provide incentives to   startups and SMEs to emerge as sub system houses. Smart negotiation of  ToT agreements  and developing  a long-term strategic plan to  establish a clear and consistent  strategy for SR  along with  a sustainable funding model have to put in place. By implementing these reforms , MOD can provide the desired course correction to not only work in progress but also  future acquisitions .

References

1. https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence -security/news/mod-to-reform-procurement-policy-in-6-12-months-defence-secretary.
2. Engineering an Innovation System for Defence Industrial Corridors, Lt Gen N B Singh, PVSM, AVSM ,VSM; South Asia Defence and Strategic Review, Sep Oct 21
3. S .Jaishankar, “Why Bharat Matters”, Rupa and Co,2024
4. Ibid
5. Rebecca Lucas, Lucia Retter, Benedict Wilkinson, Realising the Promise of the DSIS in R&D and Exports, RAND Europe ,Nov 2022

 About the Author

Lt Gen (Dr) N B Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC is a former DGEME, DGIS and Member Armed Forces Tribunal. He writes on technology related operational subjects, space and green energy initiatives.

First published in South Asia Defence and Strategic Review Aero India Special issue 2025. Published here with the author’s permission

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